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Of the nation’s 22 million veterans, only a minority (roughly 6 million) seek care or 
benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs 
(VA). However, of those who do, a plurality seek 
care for a variety of mental health issues, ranging 
from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)1 to the 
cognitive effects of traumatic brain injury (TBI) to 
mental health issues associated with the transition 
from military to civilian life. The VA will spend 
approximately $7 billion this year to meet this need, 
serving veterans through its expansive network 
comprising more than 150 hospitals, 800 community 
clinics and thousands of clinicians. However, these 
resources do not fully meet the needs of veterans 
seeking mental health care across the nation.
Historically, veterans’ mental health care needs 
have risen sharply over time, with peak expendi-
tures occurring 10 to 20 years after the end of war. 
This was true for the Vietnam War cohort and will 
likely be true for the post-9/11 combat cohort as 
well.2 Now is the time for the VA to act decisively 
to meet these generations’ needs – while it has 
ample resources to do so, before the demand among 
post-9/11 veterans spikes. There have been several 
major steps in this direction, including the hiring of 
1,600 additional clinicians and the announcement 
in September of $9 billion in contract awards for 
the VA’s new Patient-Centered Community Care 
(PCCC) initiative. These steps will greatly expand 
the VA’s capacity to meet current need but will 
likely not be enough for future demand, based on 
current veterans data and the projections of leading 
veterans organizations.3
This paper provides background on the current 
mental health needs of veterans4 and outlines 
several approaches for the VA to adopt (or embrace 
more fully) to generate additional mental health 
care capacity. Given the enormous breadth and 
diversity of veterans’ mental health care needs, this 
policy brief argues for a portfolio approach that 
will invest in a few of the most promising models to 
generate that capacity. This policy brief also recom-
mends that more attention be paid to integrating 
these approaches, including efforts to link care pro-
vided by the VA with care provided in the private 
and non-profit sectors. 
Background
In 2012, the VA cared for nearly 6 million of the 
nation’s 22 million veterans, including 83.6 mil-
lion outpatient visits and roughly 703,500 inpatient 
admissions.5 Much of this care focused on mental 
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health problems, including PTSD and TBI. As of 
July 2013, there were approximately 2.6 million 
veterans of Iraq, Afghanistan and other theaters 
of the global war on terrorism.6 The leading study 
in the field estimated that roughly 15 to 20 percent 
of these new combat veterans would come home 
with symptoms of PTSD or TBI (with significant 
overlap between these populations).7 To date, nearly 
900,000 Iraq and Afghanistan veterans have sought 
VA care, and 54 percent (486,015) of them have 
been diagnosed with a mental health disorder of 
some type.8 
In addition to heavily utilizing VA health care 
resources, today’s veterans are also filing claims for 
disability compensation at record levels. Nearly half 
of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans have filed claims 
with the VA, with each claiming eight to nine 
disabling issues on average. As of October 28, 2013, 
there were 711,775 claims pending with the VA 
for compensation or pension benefits, down from 
a high of 903,286 in March 2013,9 with 57 percent 
of the current claims pending for more than the 
VA’s target of 125 days. A majority of these pend-
ing claims contain disability contentions relating 
to mental health, including post-traumatic stress 
resulting from combat.
The most severe manifestation of the mental health 
need in the veterans community can be seen in 
the numbers of suicides within this group. The 
best data on the subject, from a recent study by the 
VA’s mental health research team, estimates that 
22 veterans die by suicide each day.10 Most did not 
serve in combat, and it is unclear how many of 
these suicides result from the stresses of military 
service or from some other factors in the veterans’ 
lives. However, the data strongly suggest that VA 
mental health outreach and care reduces suicide. 
This evidence extends to lesser manifestations 
of mental health care need as well. According to 
one recent survey, “Experts note that timely, early 
[mental health care] intervention services can 
improve veterans’ quality of life, address substance-
use problems, prevent chronic illness, promote 
recovery, and minimize the long-term disabling 
effects of undetected and untreated mental health 
problems.”11 
Unfortunately, despite this evidence, the VA has 
failed to meet demand for such care. In December 
2012, the Government Accountability Office 
concluded that outpatient medical appointment 
wait times reported by the VA were “unreliable,” 
and that scheduling problems impeded access to 
care and adversely affected patient satisfaction.12 
One recent survey reported that 91.3 percent of 
VA physicians agreed with the statement that 
“veteran patients experience delays in care as a 
result of the VA’s process of scheduling visits.”13 
A RAND report echoed this finding, stating that 
most physicians who do not work for the Veterans 
Health Administration (VHA) “report difficul-
ties accessing the appropriate level of care for their 
patients within the VHA system and feel that 
patients experience care delays, unclear roles and 
responsibilities, and lack of management plans 
for patients who use both systems.”14 The VA also 
struggles to retain veterans once they make it 
through the doors, with retention rates for veterans 
in many treatment programs often falling below 50 
percent.15 
The demand for additional mental health care 
resources for veterans is clear. The VA has begun 
addressing the shortfall by hiring more clinicians, 
using contractors and other means described below. 
Twenty-two veterans die by suicide each 
day … However, the data strongly suggest 
that VA mental health outreach and care 
reduces suicide.
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However, clinical appointment wait times remain 
long, and these approaches are not yet fully meet-
ing demand, let alone building excess capacity to 
meet projected future demands. The remainder of 
this policy brief describes how the VA can improve 
the situation by adopting a portfolio of approaches 
to delivering mental health care, and improving its 
infrustructure as well.
Models for expanding capacity
current Model (VA cAre With Mostly  
VA Personnel)
The VA provides the majority of its healthcare to 
veterans via 151 VA medical centers and more than 
800 community-based outpatient clinics – the largest 
integrated healthcare system in the country. These 
hospitals and clinics provide care to those eligible 
veterans who are enrolled with the VA and able to 
access care based on where they fall within the VA’s 
priority group schema. The VHA relies primarily on 
VA employees to provide this care, giving it the largest 
workforce in government outside of the Department 
of Defense. The VA also provides mental health care 
through its network of nearly 400 Vet Centers and 
mobile Vet Centers, which are run by a separate arm 
of the VA, the Readjustment Counseling Service.
This model differs from other agencies’ operations 
in a few important respects. First, instead of pro-
curing medical services from the private sector via 
grants or reimbursements (in the way that Medicaid 
and Medicare operate), the VA provides 90 percent 
of its care directly. Second, the VA does not rely on 
a large contractor workforce, unlike many other 
agencies that outsourced significant parts of their 
operations during the past two decades. And third, 
the VA operates alongside other care options, with 
little coordination or information-sharing between 
the VA and the non-VA health care providers that 
provide the majority of care for veterans.
There are three main ways to increase capac-
ity within the VA health care system: hire more 
clinicians, extend utilization of existing facilities 
(such as by increasing hours, or deploying new 
delivery models or care approaches) or open new 
facilities. The VA recently announced the comple-
tion of its drive to hire 1,600 additional mental 
health care providers, including psychiatrists, 
psychologists and social workers. In addition, the 
VA has launched pilot efforts around the country 
to expand its hours. These efforts have the major 
advantage of being fully integrated with the VA’s 
health care network, including patient record inte-
gration. This model also allows the VA to expand its 
capacity within existing budgetary, human capital 
and facility structures. However, this model offers 
limited scalability because of the finite capacity 
of internal VA systems, difficulties in hiring clini-
cians, practical limits on facility capacity, and high 
cost and friction associated with opening and clos-
ing facilities to meet changing demand.
current Model + (VA cAre With stAff 
AugMentAtion)
The VA currently surges its capacity by contract-
ing with private firms to add clinical and support 
staff. This model mirrors existing arrangements 
across the federal government for staff augmenta-
tion. These personnel work for their respective 
private firms, drawing pay and benefits from those 
companies. However, they integrate fully into the 
VA workforce, working for VA supervisory person-
nel (for purposes of providing mental health care) 
inside VA facilities. 
This model addresses a significant shortfall in the 
VA’s existing business model: its ability to rapidly 
scale and adapt its workforce to meet changes in 
demand. As noted above, the VHA workforce is 
composed primarily of U.S. government employ-
ees. They serve within the existing VHA personnel 
system and are tied to existing VHA facilities. 
Changes to the size, composition or location of this 
workforce require the VA to overcome significant 
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friction, including collective bargaining agree-
ments, internal VA regulations, differential costs of 
living and other factors. The contractor augmentee 
model sidesteps these challenges by leveraging a 
private sector workforce outside of the VA’s existing 
human capital systems. Unfortunately, most of this 
type of capacity generation is now done on a piece-
meal basis, at a very local level, a few providers at a 
time. There is no national effort to reap economies 
of scale from this augmentation, nor a national 
effort to ensure consistency or quality of care at a 
Veterans Integrated Service Network (VISN) or 
national level.
Further, contractor augmentation provides the 
scalability that the VA human capital system lacks. 
This model can accommodate both growth, as has 
happened in recent years, and shrinkage, a pos-
sibility in the future as the number of veterans 
declines. Although short-term costs may be higher 
for a contractor-augmented workforce, long-term 
costs will likely be lower because of this scalability 
and associated savings in benefit and retirement 
expenses. Contractor staff augmentation carries 
some perceived risk with respect to provider qual-
ity and competency. However, this risk has been 
addressed by DOD and  the VA by hiring contrac-
tors with some military experience or cultural 
competency. 
current Model ++ (VA cAre Plus contrActed 
netWorks)
A related, more expansive model for generating 
capacity involves using private firms to build, oper-
ate and manage projects, clinics or whole divisions 
of operations. Federal agencies frequently use 
this approach to procure information technology 
(IT) services, as well as to procure large systems 
or conduct major development and foreign assis-
tance abroad. At DOD, this model has been used 
to procure TRICARE networks and other health 
care and family support services. The VA uses this 
model to operate community-based outpatient 
clinics (CBOCs) and also to procure IT services and 
support, among other things. However, the VA has 
not fully embraced this model, in part because of 
concerns that it might replace its “brick and mor-
tar” facilities with non-VA providers and networks, 
reducing the overall national commitment to care for 
veterans. 
The CBOC program represents the largest VA 
effort to generate additional care capacity through 
contracting networks. Approximately 25 percent 
of CBOCs nationwide are managed on a contract 
basis for the VA, with the remainder owned and 
operated by the VA or operated by VA personnel 
in leased space. Contracted CBOCs must meet the 
VA’s standards and those of the Joint Commission,16 
and also must work within the VA health care 
system including the VA’s prescription drug formu-
lary, its appointment system and medical records 
system. The VA generally pays its CBOC contrac-
tors a monthly rate for each veteran enrolled in that 
clinic, for a package that typically includes pri-
mary care and mental health care, but the specific 
package of services varies significantly from clinic 
to clinic based on patient population, clinic capa-
bilities and other factors.17 Evidence gathered by 
the VA, Congressional auditors and independent 
researchers suggests that CBOCs cost the govern-
ment significantly less than VA medical centers, 
and produce comparable (or better) patient out-
comes and patient satisfaction.18
A related model will be available in the VA’s new 
Patient-Centered Community Care initiative, for 
which it recently awarded two contracts which may 
be worth up to $9 billion over five years. According 
to the contract announcement, the VA plans to use 
this program to purchase “inpatient and outpa-
tient specialty care and mental health care for 
eligible Veterans when the local VA Medical Center 
(VAMC) cannot readily provide the services, such 
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as when there is a lack of available specialists, there 
are long wait times, or there is an extraordinary 
distance from the Veteran’s home.”19 In addition 
to medical care and mental health care, the PCCC 
initiative will allow the VA to purchase medical 
equipment, home nursing and therapy, and other 
services for veterans. 
The PCCC program builds on earlier VA efforts 
(such as Project HERO, which ran from 2007 to 
2012) to develop more capacity in the private sec-
tor to serve veterans. Of all of the approaches in 
the portfolio, the PCCC program holds the most 
promise, because of its potential for scalabil-
ity and expansion, and the extent to which the 
PCCC networks will be integrated into the VA’s 
health care system, ensuring continuity of care. 
However, in order to reap these rewards, the VA 
will need to invest more in the PCCC program 
than it has in past programs. And in doing so, 
the VA must ensure the seamless integration of 
the PCCC provider networks into the broader VA 
healthcare system, including the VA’s electronic 
health records and appointment systems.20 The 
VA must also leverage the built-in PCCC contract 
provisions relating to training, personnel qualifi-
cations, and quality assurance, to ensure that its 
two implementing partners meet expectations for 
care under this model. The VA selected two com-
panies (TriWest Healthcare Alliance and Health 
Net Federal Services) with experience managing 
care for veterans and military personnel, a deci-
sion that should mitigate the historical concerns 
of veterans groups regarding approaches such as 
PCCC.21 
locAl PArtnershiPs
In addition to generating its own capacity, the VA has 
turned increasingly to private sector and nonprofit 
partners to provide additional resources to serve 
veterans. In general, these models rely on the VA’s 
legal authorities to enter into contracts for health care 
services or to reimburse private providers directly 
for the health care services they provide to eligible 
veterans. In theory, this category includes every 
arrangement from an individual reimbursement 
transaction to a strategic partnership with a regional 
health care organization. This policy brief focuses on 
two partnership models that have gained attention in 
recent months because of their success or broad utili-
zation: the VA’s partnership with North Shore-Long 
Island Jewish (LIJ) Health System and the collabora-
tion between the VA and Federally Qualified Health 
Centers (FQHCs). 
In 2012, North Shore-LIJ and the VA Medical 
Center at Northport developed a system of col-
laborative care for veterans and their families.22 
The system, funded by philanthropic investments 
and public dollars, enables both veterans and their 
families to be seen at the same facility, even though 
the populations technically fall under the separate 
coverage of the VA and LIJ systems respectively. 
Furthermore, the partnership enabled “cross talk” 
between civilian and VA mental health care provid-
ers, leveraging the experience of both. The system 
targeted measurable outcomes in a number of 
areas, to include impact on the veteran, the care-
giver and service providers. The model is still being 
developed, refined and evaluated by North Shore-
LIJ and the VA. If the program proves successful, it 
may be able to be replicated in other locations, with 
some variations to reflect the local partners avail-
able across the country. This model offers unique 
possibilities because of the ways it blurs lines 
between public and private facilities and providers, 
leveraging the resources of the VA to bolster the 
care capacity of existing private sector and non-
profit sector care providers and networks. 
The VA also works with FQHCs – outpatient clin-
ics funded by other federal agencies to provide 
medical services to underserved communities in 
rural and urban areas. The VA already works with 
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more than 50 FQHCs across the country to serve 
veterans in a variety of areas, leveraging a mix of 
contracting and funding mechanisms to pay for 
veterans’ health care at these non-VA centers.23 
This model offers enormous potential for the VA 
because it leverages existing health centers with 
a footprint in already underserved communities 
(where veterans are also underserved). However, as 
with other private sector and nonprofit providers, 
these centers do not integrate into the VA system, 
which limits the continuity of care they can provide 
to veterans. Similarly, the same quality and cultural 
competency issues exist for these providers in other 
non-VA facilities. However, these may be mitigated 
somewhat by the high numbers of veterans who 
use some FQHCs in underserved areas with high 
concentrations of veterans, and could be further 
mitigated by additional VA requirements that 
condition the receipt of funding on meeting speci-
fied quality or competency goals for care given to 
veterans.
PriVAte PhilAnthroPy 
Yet another approach involves deploying phil-
anthropic funds and private sector resources to 
provide mental health care to veterans. Although 
these do not offer the same ability for the VA to 
generate more capacity as the models described 
above, non-profit organizations do hold a great deal 
of promise, particularly for filling gaps in VA care, 
such as to underserved populations or populations 
not eligible for VA care (such as those veterans with 
other than honorable discharges). 
Tens of thousands of non-profit organizations serve 
veterans across the nation, with many providing 
mental health services of some type. Among these, 
four models stand out as particularly prominent, 
either because of their national reach, reputation 
or potential for expansion. The first is the Welcome 
Back Veterans initiative, which started in 2008 
and has matured into a partnership between the 
McCormick Foundation, Major League Baseball, 
and a number of academic medical centers 
including UCLA, the University of Michigan, 
Massachusetts General and others. Each medi-
cal center’s program operates differently, based on 
the needs of veterans in that community, the VA’s 
activities and the center’s capabilities. In addition 
to mental health counseling, the programs include 
outreach and peer support models, training for 
clinical providers, wellness workshops for reserv-
ists, parenting workshops, family therapy and 
research trials for new PTSD treatment approaches. 
The program also includes a small evaluative 
component, under the auspices of the RAND 
Corporation.
Another prominent example is Give an Hour, an 
organization founded in 2005 by a Washington-
area psychologist. Give an Hour manages a network 
of nearly 7,000 mental health care providers around 
the country who have agreed to provide an hour 
of therapy each week to veterans seeking mental 
health services. Give an Hour also provides varying 
degrees of connectivity between community-based 
organizations, practitioners and veterans (among 
others), as well as training and support. 
Another organization, the Tragedy Assistance 
Program for Survivors (TAPS), is a nonprofit 
organization that provides peer-based support to 
survivors of the fallen, including parents, spouses, 
children and other loved ones. TAPS provides a 
national peer mentor program, connections to grief 
support services, the National Military Survivor 
Non-profit organizations do hold a great 
deal of promise, particularly for filling 
gaps in VA care, such as to underserved 
populations or populations not eligible 
for VA care.
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Helpline and case work assistance for surviving 
family members, as well as connections to other 
organizations (including the VA). TAPS provides 
these services at no cost, and does not receive gov-
ernment funding. However, the TAPS model could 
potentially be leveraged by the VA to expand the 
capacity of its mental health net, through similar 
peer-based support models or by providing other 
types of assistance. 
A fourth model is represented by a Wounded 
Warrior Project (WWP) initiative. After hear-
ing reports that wounded warriors were waiting a 
long time for VA mental health care appointments, 
WWP worked with private insurance companies 
to expand Employee Assistance Programs to give 
veterans timely access to mental health care. In 
funding this initiative, WWP was able to leverage 
existing networks of mental health care provid-
ers and facilities. This effort does not build new 
mental health care capacity as much as it comple-
ments existing mental health services by providing 
a continuum of other services and support funded 
through WWP, making those available to WWP’s 
target population of veterans wounded, injured or 
ill in service after 9/11 (as well as their families).24 
Each of these philanthropic models has dem-
onstrated some success providing needed 
mental health care for veterans and their families. 
However, each needs more study before they can 
be expanded, exported or replicated, in order to 
determine their quality and efficacy on an objective 
basis. It may be possible for the VA to cultivate one 
or more of these models and inject public funding 
into one of these organizations to replicate their 
successes on a broader scale. However, even if the 
VA could establish an evidence base to support 
these models, such that it wanted to invest in them, 
the VA could not do so because it lacks an adequate 
legal framework for partnerships with the private 
or philanthropic sectors. In addition, mental health 
care provided through these philanthropic actors 
does not integrate into current VA health records 
or other systems, frustrating efforts to create 
continuity of care for veterans. For its part, the VA 
recognizes the need to leverage these partners more 
and has made establishing strategic partnerships a 
core objective in its 2014-2020 strategic plan.25
the PriVAte sector
More veterans seek care outside the VA than within 
it. The median age of today’s veterans population 
is 64. Consequently, nearly half of the veterans 
population qualifies by age for Medicare coverage. 
Among younger veterans, surveys indicate that 
more than 75 percent have private health insurance 
coverage. Recent research suggests that veterans 
choose the private sector for a collection of rea-
sons, including convenience, economic efficiency, 
privacy and individual perceptions of efficacy or 
appropriateness.26 
Given that most veterans seek their care (includ-
ing care for service-connected ailments) from the 
private sector, the VA must also build mental health 
care capacity there as well. The VA should look for 
ways to build clinical and cultural competency in 
the private sector through programs such as per-
sonnel exchanges, training, continuing education, 
seminars, conferences and other activities. The VA 
should also explore the development of veteran-
centric programs within private sector health 
organizations with a large volume of veterans, pos-
sibly with VA funding. Certain VA resources, such 
as the mobile Vet Centers, could also be expanded 
and deployed more to private sector hospitals and 
health campuses to provide complementary capa-
bility alongside private sector providers. And, as 
discussed more fully below, the VA should explore 
ways to create an IT environment that allows 
private sector and VA providers to share health 
information, in order to provide continuity of care 
regardless of where veterans obtain help. 
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recommendations
deVeloP And shAre dAtA regArding 
VeterAns’ MentAl heAlth cAre
Anecdotal evidence and provider surveys suggest 
that veterans have difficulty accessing VA mental 
health care. However, there is no publicly available 
data to confirm or deny this, nor to help veterans 
make decisions about care based on availability, 
wait times or other relevant data. Indeed, the 
Government Accountability Office has repeatedly 
cited the VA’s inaccurate and unreliable estimates 
of patient demand and waiting times as a serious 
concern, and an impediment to improvement.27 
Consequently, the policy debate proceeds under 
potentially flawed assumptions regarding the 
demand for mental health care services in the 
veterans community. And, more pointedly, both 
veterans and veteran-serving organizations in the 
private and nonprofit sector struggle to make smart 
decisions in the absence of data.
The VA should make available data on the utiliza-
tion of its mental health care resources, including 
wait time data for specific facilities.28 This data 
should be made available in usable form for vet-
erans, such as through geospatial information 
displays or through application interfaces like the 
VA’s PTSD application for smartphones. Such data 
would better enable VA personnel to coordinate 
and allocate resources, facilitate the allocation 
of resources within the private sector that also 
serves veterans and improve decision making by 
veterans based on the availability of mental health 
care. Ideally, such a system would also link to the 
VA’s scheduling system and give veterans a choice 
to schedule appointments from a range of nearby 
facilities and options (including contracted facili-
ties and networks) based on projected availability 
and wait times. The VA should also integrate this 
system into its nascent Veterans Relationship 
Management system and leverage the data col-
lected from its mental health care scheduling and 
interface systems to project future utilization trends 
so it can plan and allocate resources more smartly.
eMBrAce A Portfolio APProAch
Within the VA, a great deal of effort is being put 
toward internal growth, as well as to the procure-
ment of additional care networks, such as the 
PCCC contracts awarded in September 2013. 
Although no one of these approaches offers a pana-
cea, some offer more potential than others. The VA 
should develop a portfolio approach that adopts all 
of the models outlined above, investing most heav-
ily in those approaches which have the potential for 
scalability, replicability and quality care. Over time, 
the VA should reinforce its successful programs, 
eliminate unsuccessful efforts and change its infra-
structure to reflect the lessons learned through this 
evaluation.
The key to success will be a rigorous monitor-
ing and evaluation regime that assesses each VA 
program on efficiency, efficacy and programmatic 
metrics. Ultimately, these metrics should be linked 
to outcomes for veterans, such as those relating to 
veteran wellness, not merely effort expended by 
the VA or outputs of VA efforts such as man-hours 
worked or appointments conducted.29 Veterans 
organizations agree that the VA needs to do more 
to reinforce its success and eliminate nonperform-
ing programs, so as to offer only the best care 
options to veterans. In their latest independent 
budget report, four leading veterans organizations 
wrote that “VA should establish pilot programs to 
improve continuity of care and retention of veter-
ans in evidence-based PTSD treatment programs.” 
During the past five years, the VA has developed a 
nascent program evaluation capability within its 
Office of Policy and Planning. To effectively execute 
a portfolio strategy in the mental health care space 
(and others), the VA must further develop this 
capability to the point where it can conduct pro-
gram evaluations across the agency’s portfolio of 
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care, in near real time, and provide feedback to VA 
health leaders at the regional and national level, as 
well as human resources, capital planning and pro-
curement staff, to enable programmatic corrections 
based on performance.
deVeloP A WrAPAround inforMAtion 
enVironMent for cAre
The great disadvantage of a portfolio approach 
is the lack of integration for some of the models 
that provide care to veterans outside of the VA. 
Clinicians have long seen the lack of “continuity 
of care” as an impediment – particularly where 
mental health care is disconnected from primary 
care or other services, and where prescriptions are 
not necessarily checked against one another in a 
common medical record. However, the goal of an 
integrated health records system, and accompany-
ing appointments system and clinical information 
infrastructure, has also been the holy grail of 
the veterans health care arena for decades – long 
sought, at great cost, but never reached. 
To date, the focus has been on a better sys-
tem to integrate VA and DOD health records. 
Unfortunately, this falls short of the full require-
ment for the VA, which is a health information 
environment that integrates with the private sector 
and philanthropic sector as well, where veterans 
go for the majority of their health care (including 
mental health care). In some respects, the focus 
on integration with DOD has only frustrated and 
obscured the greater importance of a system that 
offers interoperability with the private sector. As 
part of its efforts to generate more mental health 
care capacity, and use a portfolio approach to doing 
so, the VA must also develop a comprehensive 
information environment that enables VA providers 
and partners in other sectors to communicate and 
share information. Such a system will improve care 
for veterans by providing better continuity across 
the range of public, private and philanthropic 
providers and also will give the VA better data 
regarding the population with which to allocate 
resources and make decisions about future agency 
operations.
deVeloP And leVerAge coMMunity 
coordinAtion strAtegies
In addition to these systems for operational coor-
dination, the VA should continue its nascent efforts 
to engage community leadership structures in its 
efforts to serve veterans. VA Secretary Eric Shinseki 
directed this summer that all VA medical centers 
conduct community engagement summits before 
the end of the fiscal year, in order to engage and 
leverage the enormous number of private organi-
zations serving veterans outside of the VA. These 
efforts should continue and be institutionalized 
through the creation of standing Citizens Advisory 
Committees at each VA medical center.30 These 
committees should include representatives from the 
veterans community, industry, local government 
and private organizations serving veterans, in a 
manner tailored to the particular landscape of each 
community.
Additionally, the VA can capitalize on existing 
community-level coordination to operate more effec-
tively at the local level. For example, King County, 
Wash., has made great strides in coordinating efforts 
at the county level. Leveraging investments from a 
modest county property tax levy (voted on by King 
County residents), it has been able to make strategic 
investments in mental health care capacity for veter-
ans and their families (among other veterans issues). 
The county invested more than $500,000 in veteran 
PTSD and mental health treatment and $200,000 in 
regional service capacity building, appointing the 
Washington State Department of Veterans Affairs as 
lead agency in the efforts.31 Within this system, the 
country has pursued a formal partnership with the 
VA Puget Sound Health Care System and other pro-
viders, playing a key role in coordinating resources 
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across the Seattle area, filling capacity gaps and 
ensuring that “consumers of community-based ser-
vices continue to be integrated into the health care 
systems of the Department of Veterans Affairs.”32
In its draft strategy for 2014-2020, the VA embraces 
the goal of improving relationships with other 
federal agencies, state and local governments, vet-
erans and military service organizations, nonprofit 
organizations and private sector firms, among 
others. The VA goes so far as to say it “must develop 
a partnership culture that entails trust, transpar-
ency, mutual benefit, responsibility, productivity, 
and accountability” and that the VA will “pursue 
opportunities for partnering with organizations 
that can best provide what [the VA] cannot or 
should not.”33 However, the VA’s strategy does not 
go nearly far enough, setting only modest goals for 
increasing the number of formal partnerships and 
increasing the numbers of states and cities included 
in the VA’s databases. If the VA is to partner more 
meaningfully and effectively with the private and 
philanthropic sectors, it must embrace a broader 
vision of its partnership, where the VA is an equal 
partner with these other sectors. The VA strategy 
should include a multicomponent structure for 
engagement with non-VA actors, including policies 
that foster such partnership, and rules within VA’s 
ethical and acquisition regulations that allow such 
partnerships to occur. The VA must also develop 
a governance and coordination structure, possibly 
by creating additional federal advisory commit-
tees, or local advisory committees in its health care 
regions or near its major medical centers. And the 
VA should invest in these community partner-
ships, using VA capital to fund the “best practice” 
organizations that are serving veterans in the phil-
anthropic and private sectors, and arguably doing 
so as well as (or better than) the VA.
Build A huMAn cAPitAl PiPeline
Current efforts to add clinical staff at the VA have 
been hindered by a national shortage of qualified, 
available mental health care personnel. This lack of 
clinicians who have cultural competency in work-
ing with veterans and the military community 
has exacerbated the shortage, and made it very 
difficult for the VA to expand its workforce. The 
VA should address this by expanding its partner-
ships with academic medical programs to include 
additional programs that develop mental health 
care personnel. This expansion should build on the 
VA’s extensive program for clinical internships. The 
human capital pipeline should also leverage exist-
ing relationships between the VA and programs 
producing clinical social workers and psycholo-
gists with specializations in military social work or 
related disciplines, such as those at the University 
of Southern California and University of South 
Carolina.34 The VA should invest in these pro-
grams, expand them and seek to replicate them, 
particularly where they can help produce additional 
clinical personnel to serve underserved populations 
(such as in rural areas). The VA should also look for 
opportunities to integrate veterans into its human 
capital pipeline, ranging from work in Vet Centers 
and outpatient clinics to service in VA medical 
centers. In furtherance of this goal, the VA should 
study the feasibility of a national scholarship, 
apprenticeship or training program (possibly tied 
to existing VA educational benefits) that would gen-
erate its own pipeline of veterans with the training 
and desire to provide mental health care services to 
fellow veterans in VA facilities.
inVest in eMerging technologies
Emerging technologies hold enormous promise 
for the VA and its efforts to provide mental health 
care services to veterans. Telemedicine is the most 
mature of these technologies, with significant 
evidence to show its efficacy and support its expan-
sion. This technology holds particular promise for 
expanding VA care in underserved communities 
(such as rural areas), and for serving the digital 
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natives of the millennial generation, for whom 
communication via Skype is as natural as participa-
tion in a Vet Center rap group was for the Vietnam 
War generation. 
The VA should also invest in fitness monitoring 
and communications technologies that can expand 
the net of mental health care. These include hard-
ware solutions such as the “FitBit,” which monitors 
physical activity, sleep, weight and other behaviors, 
and software solutions such as the PTSD Coach, 
developed by the VA and fielded to more than 
100,000 smartphone users.35 Because connectiv-
ity and technology may pose barriers to entry for 
some veterans, the VA should consider investing in 
the provision of smartphones to veterans where it 
determines that the benefits of doing so outweigh 
the costs, and compare favorably to the costs of 
providing comparable care and services via existing 
VA brick and mortar facilities. 
A third area for investment is virtual reality tech-
nology and its application for both the training of 
clinical personnel and the treatment of veterans. 
Enormous strides have been made in the use of 
simulations for training purposes, with the lat-
est advances in avatar technology and artificial 
intelligence providing fully interactive, dynamic, 
unscripted computer-generated simulations that 
can replicate the clinical environment.36 Extensive 
DOD funding has led to many of these advances, 
both for purposes of building combat simulations 
for military training purposes and for clinical 
purposes. These simulations can be used to gener-
ate mental health care capacity, through training 
of new clinicians and developing cultural compe-
tency among existing providers. In the future, such 
technologies could also mature to the point where 
they can be used for clinical treatment as well. With 
additional investment and development, virtual 
reality counseling sessions could be used to moni-
tor veterans and provide other rote forms of clinical 
support. It is even possible to imagine counseling 
provided through virtual reality simulations that 
would go beyond this, such as counseling groups 
that would bring together veterans in a virtual 
environment to interact via avatars. 
conclusion
The VA will spend at least $7 billion this fiscal year 
on mental health to serve more than 1.3 million 
veterans.37 As large as these dollar figures are, the 
VA still will not meet the needs of all veterans who 
need mental health care. Treatment clearly makes 
a difference for veterans suffering from the invis-
ible wounds of war: those receiving treatment do 
better in managing their post-traumatic stress or 
traumatic brain injury and are less likely to com-
mit suicide. The VA should use the approaches 
described above to expand and extend the net of 
mental health care it provides to veterans.
Phillip Carter is a Senior Fellow, Counsel, and 
Director of the Military, Veterans, and Society 
Program at the Center for a New American Security.
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